. 445-468 F. A. Hayek developed a number of core insights into the nature of social and political reality. None are more central to his thought than his study of "spontaneous order:" patterns of coordination arising within systems of action which are not deliberate constructions of either those outside the system or those acting within it. This concept is analogous to terms increasingly encountered today in other fields, such as emergent order, self-organizing system, and mutual causality.
1 included the market, common law, custom, language, science, and society as a whole. 2 The concept has also been independently applied to liberal democracy. 3 Spontaneous orders are distinguished from what Hayek termed "made orders," such as bureaucracies and corporations, because their patterns of coherence arise from participants pursuing self-chosen goals, often in ignorance of the goals pursued by other participants. Consequently, any coordination of action that arises must be independent of participants' intentions. Coordination in spontaneous orders is accomplished by signals participants pick up, enabling them to adapt to systemic changes engendered by earlier actions of others.
A spontaneous order is primarily a communication network. The signals it generates increase the likelihood that participants' independently chosen plans will be successful. The signals take place through elaborate patterns of feedback arising out of the procedural rules that generate self-organizing process. Such rules are silent as to what goals can be sought, but specify how the seeking shall take place. At a general level, they must promote cooperation because the more participants expect reliable relationships the more they will pursue their goals within that system of rules.
As a spontaneous order, Hayek argued the market could integrate far more information than could deliberately imposed planning, and do so in a way that facilitated Hayek often sought to delineate the appropriate bounds of political action in market societies. Interestingly, he allowed for governmental action far beyond what was believed appropriate by many classical liberals and libertarians. 5 Acknowledging a need for substantial public policy combined with suspicion of its safety and efficacy, Hayek sought to discover its appropriate limits. He never resolved the matter, leaving us two very different perspectives on the issue.
The first Hayekian standard was expressed in terms of externalities and public goods in the economist's sense. But Hayek offered another more procedural and political standard. This second is in better keeping with his emphasis on the limits to human knowledge and the central role discovery must play in complex social institutions where no participant can have any but the most fragmentary knowledge of the whole.
Economistic Politics
In Law, Legislation and Liberty, Hayek wrote that while provision of and control over "commodities in the narrow sense" are most appropriately confined to the market order, with respect to land "this is true only to a limited degree."
6 "Neighborhood effects" as well as pollution and the like, may not be factored into decisions having 5 Gerard Radnitzky, Hayek on the Role of the State: A Radical Libertarian Critique.
Policy, Autumn, 2000, pp. 16-20 provided by the market. These are collective or public goods proper, the provision of which it will be necessary to devise some method other than that of sale to individual users."
7
From this perspective government can appropriately be called upon to deal with significant positive and negative externalities and assist in the provision of true public goods. To objections that this approach expands the realm of governmental coercion beyond the classic "night-watchman state" enforcing rules of just conduct, Hayek replied 8 . . . a truer way of looking at it is to regard it as a sort of exchange: each agreeing to contribute to a common pool according to the same uniform principles on the understanding that his wishes with regard to the services to be financed from that 7 op. sit., p. 44.
8 op. sit., p. 45. There is an ambiguity here. Benefiting proportionately to one's contributions and benefiting more than one contributes are different standards. I can benefit proportionately and still regard myself as worse off. I can benefit less than anyone else and regard myself as better off. Hayek's argument depends upon the latter meaning, which is also central to his defense of the legitimacy of market inequality. see
Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. II. The Myth of Social Justice, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 73-4, 94, 98-9. 5 pool will be satisfied in proportion to his contributions. So long as each may expect to get from this common pool services which are worth more to him than what he is made to contribute, it will be in his interest to submit to the coercion.
. . . all we can aim at will be that each should feel that in the aggregate all the collective goods which are supplied to him are worth at least as much as the contribution he is required to make.
Here Hayek offers a market economist's approach to evaluating governmental action; distinguishing between private and public goods, and making ample allowance for a vigorous public sphere, but justifying it by purely economic reasoning. The market should provide all goods through contractual processes except when externalities are serious enough to require governmental action, or genuine public or collective goods are involved. Even so, Hayek reminds his readers, "in the case of public goods proper, as well as in some instances of these 'external effects' which make part of effects of individual activities a kind of collective good (or collective nuisance), we are resorting to an inferior method of providing these services because the conditions necessary for their being provided by the more efficient method of the market are absent." Hayek also observed that over time people tend to benefit disproportionately from the success of family members devoting their wealth to improving their children's lives. This is not necessarily a problem, though it will "tend to increase the discrepancy between the merits of a person's current efforts and the benefits which he currently receives." 14 On balance, everyone, even the poor, benefit from the market order, although not always equally.
12 op. sit., p. 129. Democracy is, above all, a process of forming opinion. Its chief advantage lies not in its method of selecting those who govern but in the fact that, because a great part of the population takes an active part in the formulation of opinion, a correspondingly wide range of persons is available from which to select. . . . It is its dynamic, rather than in its static, aspects that the value of democracy proves itself. As is true of liberty, the benefits of democracy will show themselves only in the long run, while its more immediate achievements may well be inferior to . . . other forms of government."
Hayek argues that democracy is a process of discovery, writing "It is because we
do not yet know which of the many competing new opinions will prove the best that we wait until it has gained sufficient support." Further, "It is because we normally do not know who knows best that we leave the decision to a process which we do not control."
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Hayek's praise is remarkably similar to his praise of spontaneous orders.
These are isolated insights, interspersed in texts filled with warnings about the inferiority and dangers of governmental power. 
Context and Consent
In The Economy of the Earth, Mark Sagoff described a dilemma with traditional economic approaches to evaluating consumer choice and consent. A number of years ago, when the Disney Corporation proposed building a ski resort in California's Mineral
King valley, Sagoff asked his students whether they would want to visit the resort if it were built. Most indicated they would. He then asked them whether the resort should be built. Most regarded the idea as an abomination.
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A superficial analysis would hold that the students' choices contradicted one another. A cynic would say money speaks louder than words, and so it should be built.
A more insightful approach would note that the students chose within two different 14 resort exist? These are different questions, and there is no contradiction in the answers the students gave.
The situation Sagoff describes is hardly unusual. I can coherently approve of high "sin" taxes on cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, and also buy my cigarettes, beer and wine where they are sold most cheaply. I can support a wide variety of governmental programs and taxes to pay for them, and take advantage of every tax loophole I can find.
These examples illustrate how context influences choice. In one instance I am asked what should be the context of general rules and values within which I will act. In the other, the context of rules and enforced values under which I act is taken for granted, and I seek to obtain the most advantageous outcome for myself, given the concrete choices confronting me.
We can in principle adopt a mutually acceptable constitutional framework for promoting values we think important for our community. This is true even if we expect sometimes to lose. This framework establishes a "common good" for the community concerned. It creates a different, and appropriately prior, context for decision-making than does the market.
Determining public values and goods for a society involves our acting in a different capacity than when acting as private individuals seeking our goals within the framework set up by our acting in that first capacity. 
Discovery and the Public Good
Public goods in this sense are different from the term in economic theory. They are goods for us as a community. Discovering them depends on public decision-making.
We ask "what do I think is best for us?" And at some point we decide. Of course, any of us can ask "What do I want?" But in this context, when the "us" is lost from sight, such reasoning becomes corruption. Corruption is an ongoing problem in public discussion and decision-making, just as fraud and deception is an ongoing problem in private exchange.
The procedural rules of formal political equality, freedom of speech, organization, and the press, generate the spontaneous order we term liberal democracy. "Democracy" in this sense includes the entire field of political communication and discovery, and not just formal political institutions such as parties and legislatures. Like the rules generating the market, they apply to all equally do not specify particular goals. Like the market, they generate as much a system of discovery as a framework for action. 28 In his discussion of policy formation, John Kingdon calls democracy an "organized anarchy," comparable to evolutionary processes or "organized complexity" such as Hayek Ideally, the public good is discovered and constituted by a process of political discussion and decision-making under fair rules for political equals. Only such rules could reasonably win universal rational assent. Equality in this case means that all citizens possess the same formal rights of participation, even if they make different use of such rights, and that all have a "reasonable" opportunity to influence decision-making.
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Actual practice falls short of this ideal, but approaches it closely enough that democracies are not comprehensible as organized hierarchies of rule.
We have described a conception of the public good closer to Jefferson, or perhaps even Aristotle than to neoclassical economics, and have done so entirely through
Hayekian reasoning. The only new element added is the observation that our choices are strongly influenced by the context in which we act. In a different context Hayek acknowledges this insight in his analysis of how market processes teach rationality.
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From this perspective the public good is whatever arises out of a context of public Any signals generated by the rules maintaining a spontaneous order simplify the values motivating human action. With respect to the market, democracy, and science, we need not agree on anything but prices, the number of votes, or the quality of research.
These simplifications necessarily involve a loss of potentially relevant information.
Systemic and Individual resources
Building on our distinction of democratic politics as serving different values from market action enables us to begin developing a Hayekian theory of systemic contradiction. As used in this paper, "systemic contradiction" refers to clashes at the systemic rather than the individual level between either two self-organizing systems of Distinguishing between individual and systemic characteristics allows us to differentiate between individual and systemic resources. Individual resources are whatever a person finds useful in the pursuit of whatever goals he or she seeks to accomplish. Systemic resources are defined by a system's feedback mechanism, and may or may not be particularly important to individuals acting within them. In the market, feedback occurs through profit and loss, and the market's systemic resource is money. In science, feedback occurs through peer recognition of a scientist's work. Science's systemic resource is professional recognition. In liberal democracy feedback occurs through votes. Democracy's systemic resource is political influence.
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Systemic success is defined as increasing a participant's access to systemic resources. Systemic failure reduces that store. But personal satisfaction is logically and empirically disconnected from being defined in terms of systemic resources. Systemic success is not the same as individual success. I can have few systemic resources and regard myself, and be regarded by others, as having led a good, happy, and successful life. I can acquire many systemic resources and be utterly miserable.
In modern society people participate in several spontaneous orders, whose values rarely if ever perfectly reflect their individual values. However, by participating within an order, people increase its complexity, that is, the amount of information it coordinates independently of human intent. In doing so they strengthen its relative independence from concrete human intentions.
By participating, people increase or decrease their supply of systemic resources, and therefore their ability to influence the system within which they participate.
However, because each person is motivated by more values than are served by any particular spontaneous order, they will often seek to convert resources obtained within one system into another system, the better to pursue their personal goals. All this intricacy plays out not only at the level of individual satisfaction, it also influences the interactions of these systems with one another, as mediated through the minds and plans of participants. And these systems are experienced by their participants as operating largely independently of human intent.
Systemic Conflict
We can now locate three points of systemic conflict:
I.
Those with systemic resources can try to expand their success within the system through creating ever stronger goal pursuing organizations seeking to subject the system's self-organizing character to explicit organizational priorities. There are of course other ways to seek systemic success, but this approach brings the seeker into conflict with the rules generating the system itself.
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A major example of this conflict concerns the role information plays in spontaneous orders and instrumental organizations. Spontaneous orders benefit from information-rich environments because we can never tell in advance who will find the what piece of information useful. Instrumental organizations, by contrast, regard information as a valuable resource, one best controlled for the benefit of the organization or its leadership. Freely available information is valuable within a spontaneous order because we cannot tell in advance what information will be used productively whereas in an instrumental organization this same characteristic can be a threat.
A spontaneous order depends on no organization being able to free itself significantly from its subordination to self-organizing processes. Organizations must continually adapt to situations outside their control. When holders of substantial systemic resources experience the need to adapt as a burden, they will have private interests at odds with the values generating the system as a whole. This, of course, describes the appeal of monopoly and oligopoly to organizations in the market, academic science, and democracy. This is an internal systemic contradiction in the sense that the interests of the organization are opposed to the interests of the order within which it exists.
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II.
36 Of course, organizations can also take on an additional relative independence from their members, but that is another matter. James Q. This kind of systemic contradiction is a natural outgrowth of individuals pursuing ends that comprise a human life, rather than staying within the less dimensional model of values underlying the rules generating any particular spontaneous order. Fortunately, established spontaneous orders appear to be quite robust, and apparently can absorb considerable "spill-over" of this kind. However, if the influx of extra-systemic resources is great enough, the system's capacity to pursue its own values is undermined. Here is our second systemic contradiction: one system essentially colonizes another by distorting and even overwhelming its feedback processes.
III.
Related to this contradiction is a third: the problem of systemic actors using their resources to expand these systems within society as a whole, encompassing new areas of It must be provided as additional information. Once known, it can profoundly affect prices.
I hope it is clear that systemic expansion is neither automatically desirable nor undesirable. When expansion occurs through informed persuasion, it probably produces more benefits than losses because the tradeoffs are mostly made by deliberate choice.
However, when expansion happens largely independently of persuasion, through transforming the context of choice within a way of life without any deliberate decision to do so the value of the trade off from reducing the importance of some values in order to facilitate action within a spontaneous order becomes more problematic.
In such cases spontaneous orders tend to subvert or subordinate one another or ways of life that have heretofore not been incorporated into those particular selforganizing processes. This argument depends on the central assumption that the market is a neutral tool for facilitating exchange. 42 Our discussion of systemic contradiction demonstrates that this assumption is false. Markets establish one context for exchange, a context that can be extraordinarily productive, but biased in favor of particular values. Other spontaneous orders are similarly biased, but towards different values. Therefore we cannot simply assume that the interaction of these orders will be harmonious, even though they are all predicated on formally voluntary relationships.
Individuals pursuing their plans give what they believe to be appropriate weight to the differing values not only of the market, science, and democracy. They also balance these values with others, such as love and friendship, play and spirituality. Each person balances these values in his or her own way.
To the degree that a system of human cooperation is able to free itself from sensitivity to individual values, it becomes inhuman. Because it is divorced from the world of human values yet powerfully determinative of concrete human actions, it becomes coercive through its transformation and domination of context. Sagoff's example of the ski resort fits perfectly here. To illustrate this observation, I will use the commodification of the print media as it transforms the media's relationship to public and consumer values; that is, to liberal democracy and the market. However, similar kinds of analyses could be made of any institution which straddles different spontaneous orders. Consequently, this framework could evaluate institutions dependent on any intersection of spontaneous or emergent orders based on different coordinating and feedback principles. This includes not only social analysis narrowly conceived, it also encompasses the intersection of the social world with the emergent order of nature.
Newspapers and the Public Good
Historically the best way for citizens to obtain the information necessary to keep an eye on those in power has been through a network of many independent newspapers and other media. This is more than simply a market function. One difference between corporate ownership and individual human ownership is to observe that when a human being owns a paper, he or she adjusts many competing values, including the desire for money profit, in making business decisions. For human beings, profitability is a signal, not a command. The mix of value trade offs will vary from owner to owner, some rating money profit as simply a means to other ends they serve through their paper, at the other extreme others think of their paper as only a means for making money.
By contrast, corporations tend to subordinate every other value to money profit values. Management is legally obligated to serve shareholders and shareholders generally invest for financial return. Voting is weighted by financial investment.
Further, ownership of public corporations is increasingly mediated by mutual funds.
Today most shareholders do not even know what stocks their mutual funds have invested in. As share ownership become increasingly divorced from the other kinds of responsibilities traditionally associated with ownership -particularly through mutual funds -these systemic biases increase.
The difference between these two kinds of ownership -one dependent on the market but able to make complex trade offs with competing values, the other increasingly a pure case of serving market values, becomes important when we look at the public/political services of a free press. In a liberal democratic order the press straddles two separate self-organizing value systems: the market and democracy. Balancing the different values promoted by these systems used to be done through the personal decisions of individual newspaper publishers and their staffs. Today this is less and less the case.
From a pure market perspective, consumers historically "subsidized" the advocacy and protection of democratic public values. Political news has primarily been of immediate value to citizens who, in different ways, disseminate their political influence throughout society. 44 The paper's news sections were subsidized by sections devoted to generating revenue.
Any such 'subsidy' deprives the owner of some market resources which might have been acquired if, instead of serving public values, he or she had only sought market resources. Therefore a newspaper solely interested in serving market values, that is consumer interests, will tend to acquire more market resources than will one choosing otherwise. In a competitive newspaper market, over time market values will tend to have a competitive edge over public values because, in general, the paper that puts financial values above all others will be more likely to acquire them than will others. This is particularly the case when a newspaper is up for sale. A buyer seeking to take advantage of unexploited market opportunities will be able to offer more than one more interested in taking advantage of maximizing acquisition of public resources.
45
44 Kingdon, (1995), and diZerega, (1991) . 45 In purely market terms this is an advantage. In a public corporation the take over threat keeps companies acting more efficiently in market terms. See Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, April, 73 (1965) .
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When technology reduced the cost of printing in the mid-nineteenth century, enabling the "penny press" to arise, papers became free from the party control that had hitherto dominated newspaper publishing in the US. The lowered costs of production enabled papers to seek a mass rather than a partisan market. Partisanship now reflected the views of editors and owners rather than political sponsors. A large market opened up new sources for income, particularly advertising. But to acquire that market papers had to offer less partisan reporting in order to appeal to all readers. James Q. Wilson observed that the quality of reporting improved as particular papers became better established, having bought up competitors, particularly in large cities.
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Such papers serve a "border" role. They are market institutions seeking to make profits and also political institutions serving public purposes: keeping tabs on and sometimes challenging the government. Historically, the balance between these roles was maintained in large part by the journalistic practice of keeping newsrooms separate from other departments of the paper serving more purely commercial goals. No inner logic requires this in order for papers to be profitable. It reflects instead journalists and publishers choosing not to subordinate every element of the paper to acquiring market resources. The best safeguards for newspapers serving public values while depending on consumers and advertisers for their financial success are the power of journalistic ethics and culture, individual or family ownership, and the relative ease of successful paper start-ups. With the rise of public corporations the structure of the market also constrains human freedom. To survive not only must an enterprise be profitable, it must seek only profits. All other goals, including most of what human beings regard as important, must be subordinated to maximizing profit. Profit shifts from being an important aid in assisting people in the pursuit of their projects to an implacable and inhuman authority to which all other values must be subordinated. It may be that the market's optimal contribution to human well-being requires decisions within the market not being too effectively guided by market values alone.
I hope that this analysis has shown that Hayek's theoretical framework is a rich one indeed, offering insights that do not fit easily into contemporary ideological categories. Careful examination of his concept of spontaneous orders frees his work from its subordination to a particular school of political and economic thought, enabling it to address a wide range of theoretical problems in political theory from a new vantage point.
Indeed, any time the major systemic orders of modernity interact with one another, or with the equally emergent processes of the natural world, the Hayekian framework offers us a rich framework for investigation.
